After 220 days of the ongoing war between Washington and Tehran, it is clear that it is likely to continue, possibly until the end of the year. This is not only because neither side has been able to inflict a complete defeat on the other, but also because the course of the war and the associated developments might make the cost of exiting it higher than the losses of continuing and fighting, along with their burdens.
In the past few weeks, a noticeable shift has occurred in crisis management from both sides, both operationally and in the scope of the media and political discourse. Tehran has moved from a military and political defensive position to adopting the narrative of a controlling force that imposes conditions for reaching an agreement or showing any flexibility, even partially. This is particularly true regarding the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and facilitating navigation there, which has become the core of the dispute between the two sides and the dilemma that almost paralyzed energy trade globally. Thus, the opening of the strait has become the most important objective and desired goal, both American and global, after the war began with lofty goals that included changing the Iranian regime and dismantling the nuclear program.
As for the previously arrogant American discourse, which persisted until last June, it has radically changed with Trump's announcement that the war will continue beyond the midterm elections of Congress on November 3rd. It has further regressed in recent days, becoming more flexible, realistic, and modest in substance and discourse. He stated, "What we are paying now is much less than the cost of Iran having a nuclear weapon," meaning that military failure and the resulting losses are a small price compared to preventing Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. He also said a few days ago, "We don't know who we should deal with in Iran," after previously boasting that Washington was in contact with "great people" in Tehran.
He had declared at the beginning of the war that it would last only four to six weeks but recanted last Thursday, after seven months into the war, justifying that statement by saying he was referring to the time required to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat, not the timing for ending the entire war.
There are many indications of Trump's retreats and contradictions practically, not just in statements. However, the significant new development is the practical behavior that reveals, in one corner, Trump's inability to achieve a military or political victory. This suggests that it is not in his interest to end the war quickly, at least not before the internal deadline related to the midterm elections of the U.S. Congress.
Unintentionally, Trump's response to Iran's recent proposal described as the seven-day plan, which places the nuclear file at the forefront of Washington's demands from Iran, represents an American acknowledgment of a political defeat, not just a military one. In the American-Iranian case, and measuring the power balance gap between them, Washington's failure to achieve a decisive military victory over Tehran, or even to achieve the same objectives through negotiation and mediation, is nothing short of a defeat for the U.S. military, ranked first in the world. It is a political setback for the greatest empire in a dwindling global system.
This does not necessarily mean that the military situation will remain suspended as it is; on the contrary, it is more likely that Trump will lean toward moving forward and initiate a major military operation against Iran, in hopes of tipping the balance in favor of the Republicans in the elections. If he does not do so before the elections, he will certainly do it after the elections, regardless of their outcomes. Whether Trump launches that attack quickly or later, or retracts from it entirely; the result will be the continuation of the war, at least for several months that may extend beyond the end of this year.